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GARDNER v. DIXON
1992 U:S. App. LEXIS 12971
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS

HOLDING

At 12:30 a.mh. on December 23, 1982, John Sterling Gardner, Jr.
entered a restaurant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and demanded
money from two employees at gunpoint. Though the employees turned
over the money without a struggle, Gardner killed them, shooting them
in the head and neck. Before Gardner fled in awaiting automobile, Linda
Cain, another employee, had eye contact with him for several seconds.
In March 1983, an inmate at the Forsyth County jail implicated
Gardner in the murders. After Gardner initially denied that he was the
triggerman, the police took Gardner to the crime scene where Gardner
confessed to the murders in detail. At trial Gardner recanted his
confession and presented an alibi defense. In September 1983, Gardner
was convicted by the jury under the felony-murder rule of two counts of
first degree murder. The jury recommended the death penalty at the
sentencing stage.
After the North Carolina Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction,t Gardner commenced state habeas proceedings, but was denied relief.2 The federal district court also denied
his petition. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Gardner claimed that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial counsel. In
making his claim, Gardner argued that: (1) his attorney had failed to
spend adequate time preparing for the case; (2) he had not performed a
thorough investigation of social service records and possible witnesses
who would have provided mitigating evidence; and (3) his attorney's
performance was "generally" ineffective. 3 Gardner also petitioned for
relief based on the trial court's failure to appoint a psychiatric expert in
4
violation of his due process rights under Ake v. Oklahoma. In addition,
Gardner claimed that a comment the prosecutor made to the jury during
closing arguments asking them to compare the victims to their 5own
children was improper and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

Applying the test for ineffective assistance of counsel established
by Stricklandv.Washington,6 the Fourth Circuit held that Gardner failed
to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard ofreasonableness, especially in light ofGardner's reluctance to
cooperate fully with his attomey. 7 Furthermore, the court held that
although the claim based on inadequate investigation was a close one,
Gardner had failed to show how his attorney's investigation efforts
ultimately prejudiced his defense, 8 and therefore found no merit in his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 9 As to the prosecutor's remark
asking the jury to compare the victims to their own children, the court
found that it was unquestionably improper, because "it invites the jury to
'depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal
interest and bias rather than on the evidence'." 10 Despite this finding, the
Fourth Circuit failed to find resulting prejudice from the remarks
11
necessary to warrant a new hearing.
Finally, the court held that the requirement of a state-appointed
12
expert under Ake is a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, and therefore,
because Gardner's trial occurred in 1983 before the Supreme Court
decided Ake, the rule could not be applied retroactively upon collateral
review.13

I State v. Gardner,319 S.E.2d 591, 594-96 (N.C. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
2 Gardnerv. State, 361 S.E.2d 598 (N.C. 1986), cert. denied, 486

questions he asked Gardner aboutprevious Mirandawarnings and about
an unrelated, unadjudicated crime; and finally, Gardner's argument that
the jury instructions and verdict form improperly required unanimity in
finding the existence of mitigating factors.
6 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984).
7 Gardnerv. Dixon, No. CA-88-179-WS, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
12971 at *14-*20 (4th Cir. June 4, 1992).
8 The court noted that despite Gardner's assertions that Fraser
failed to put on an adequate case in mitigation, the jury "specifically
found as mitigating circumstances Gardner's family history, his history
of alcohol abuse, and drug addiction ....Id. at *23.
9 Id. at *25.
10 Id. at *31 (quoting U.S. v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 328 (7th Cir.
1989)).
11 Id. at *31.
12 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d. 932,
938-39, and case summary of Bassette, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 2,p. 8 (1991).
13 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 at *33.

U.S. 1061 (1987), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1246 (1988).
3 To prove general ineffectiveness, Gardner offered the testimony
of another criminal defense attorney who testified that he would have
handled the case differently.
4 470 U.S. 68 (1985). InAke, the Courtheld that"when a defendant
has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense
is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a
Stateprovide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue." Id.at 74.
9 Gardner assigned a number of other errors. Some of these the
court dealt with in conclusory fashion, while others did not involve death
penalty law or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around
facts peculiar to this case. These issues, which will not be discussed in
this summary, include: the state's failure to produce discovery relating
to statements made by, and possible inducements made to, the inmate
who implicated Gardner (seeMiles, Subtle Influences:The Constitutionality ofJailhouseInformant Testimony in CapitalCases,Capital Defense
Digest, this issue); alleged misconduct by the prosecutor with respect to

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Gardner's chief argumeni on appeal was that trial counsel's performance amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. According to
Gardner, his attorney's primary failure occurred at the sentencing phase
of the trial when he neglected to call relatives as character witnesses or
to present county social service records indicating a troubled home life

CapitalDefense Digest,Vol. 5, No. 1 - Page 31
as a youth. Gardner blamed these failures on the fact that his attorney had
not made a thorough investigation which would have uncovered this
14
mitigating evidence.
The court began by acknowledging that "[an attorney has a duty to
'conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal to determine
if matters of defense can be developed.. .'.15 However, citing Bunch
v. Thompson,16 the court also stated that a proper evaluation of attorney
misconduct calls for an examination of the "totality of the circumstances."' 17 In this case, the court pointed out that the attorney had just
two months to prepare for Gardner's case and that Gardner had handicapped his own defense by insisting on an alibi defense after having
confessed. 18 Second, the court noted that the attorney had informed
Gardner that testimony from family members about his childhood home
life would be valuable mitigating evidence. 19 Gardner nevertheless
wished to avoid the involvement of his family and rejected counsel's
attempts to contact family members, informing the attorney that such an
investigation would be fruitless. Finally, the Court concluded that there
was no reason for Gardner's attorney to believe that county social service
20
records would be helpful or that they even existed in this case.
The court did hold that counsel's duty to investigate is not limited
by the information provided to him by his client; a reasonable investigation requires more than the typical defendant can provide. 21 However,
in evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "a defendant's
cooperativeness in the investigative process ... helps determine the
reasonableness of a particular course of conduct. '22 The court afforded
substantial weight to the evidence in the record that showed Gardnermay
have impeded his counsel's efforts by a lack of cooperation. In conclusion, although the court found that the issue of whether Gardner's
attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances was a close question,
the court decided that the attorney's conduct did not amount to ineffec23
tive assistance.
Defense counsel in Virginia should note that although the court did
not find a violation of Gardner's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, his attorney's lack of investigation probably fell
short ofprofessional responsibility requirements. The obligation to fully
investigate all possible mitigating evidence extends beyond the wishes
of the defendant.24 People accused of crimes, especially capital murder,
cannot be fully relied upon to dictate investigation strategy, as their
judgment is often impaired under the tremendous stress of their position.
Therefore, defense counsel must weigh requests by the defendant to not
pursue certain avenues of investigation against the need to properly
defend one's client. Nothing in the Virginia Code of Professional

Responsibility, for example, would have prevented Gardner's attorney
from pursuing interviews with witnesses for the case in mitigation over
the objection of his client. In fact, he had a positive duty to do so.
Although the court did not fault Gardner's attorney for failing to
search social service records, in most cases, this should be standard
procedure. School records, medical and mental health records, and
police records all may contain valuable evidence that the defendant may
be hesitant to offer voluntarily. Release of some records will require the
consent of the defendant, but others may be acquired during the normal
discovery procedures. Precise documentation of the investigation by
defense counsel is essential in defending against later claims that
representation was ineffective. In Gardner,the court gave a great deal
of weight to the fact that the attorney's records indicated that he had spent
one-hundred-fifty hours preparing for this case.25
Defense counsel wishing to employ an ineffective representation
claim on appeal should stress, as Gardner's appellate counsel did, that
trial counsel failed to pursue many possible sources of mitigating
evidence. Being able to show that such evidence was readily available
may persuade an appellate court. Although the Fourth Circuit ruled
against Gardner, it discussed the issue extensively and noted that whether
the attorney's behavior amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel
was a close question. Although the Strickland test seems to favor
deference to the judgment of the trial attorney, it is essential that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims be pursued vigorously when
appropriate.

14 Gardner also claimed that his attorney spent an inadequate

22 Id.
23 Id. at *21.
24 Two recent Fourth Circuit cases which address ineffective

amount oftime on his case, but the Court notes that the attorney's records
belied this assertion. Gardner also submitted evidence that his lawyer
had been reprimanded by the state bar and that he had drug and alcohol
problems stemming back to the time of Gardner's trial. The court ruled
that this addition to the records was untimely and that the record failed
to suggest any prejudice to the defendant due to drug and alcohol abuse.
Id. at *20.
15 Id. at --:12, (quoting Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,226 (4th Cir.
1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 849 (1968)).
16 949 F. 2d. 1354 (4th Cir. 1991). See case summary of Bunch,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 3 (1992).
17 Gardner,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 at "12.
18 Id. at :13.
19 Id. at :14.
20 Id. at; 18. Although the Eleventh Circuit has held in Thompson
v. Wainright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1042 (1987), that a defendant's childhood and school records
should be investigated, in that case the defendant had manifested psychological problems which Gardner did not have.
21 Gardner,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 at "19.

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Gardner asserted that the prosecutor's remark during closing arguments asking the jury to think of the victims as "your kids [and] ...my
kids" violated the defendant's right to due process. Relying upon
Gaskins v. McKellar,26 the court noted, however, that inappropriate
prosecutorial comments in the presence of the jury deny a defendant due
process only in cases where "the disputed statement so infected the...
sentencing with unfairness that the ultimate conviction and sentence
constituted a denial of due process. ' 27 Failing to find such an infection,
the court denied the motion for a new sentencing hearing.
The court stated in no uncertain terms, however, that the remarks
were improper.28 Defense counsel must be on guard during closing
arguments for such inflammatory remarks, which play on the jury's
emotions and interfere with their role as neutral decision-makers. Defense counsel should make a proper and timely objection to such

assistance of counsel claims are Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354
(1991); and Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (1991). See case summary
of Bunch, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4,No. 2, p. 3 (1992); and case
summary of Jones, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992).
The issues ofprofessional responsibility and ineffective assistance of counsel meet head on in Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
129, 419 S.E.2d 656 (1992). In Davidson, the defendant asked that his
attorneys not offer any evidence during the sentencing phase, even after
being informed of the possible value of various mitigating evidence. See
case summary of Davidson, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
25 Gardner,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 at *11.
26 916 F.2d 941,951 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2277

(1991).

27 Gardner,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 at *30, (citing Gaskins
v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941,951 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
2277 (1991)).
28 Id. at *31.
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comments. Such an objection bears special significance, as it addresses
a constitutional violation. Finally, counsel must take care to preserve this
issue for appeal on both state and federal grounds.
III. Denial of Court Appointed Psychiatric Expert
Two years after the completion of Gardner's trial, the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma29 that a defendant had the right to a state
appointed psychiatric expert in cases where sanity at the time of the
offense was an issue. Gardner, whose conviction became final before
Ake was decided, claimed that the rule should be applied retroactively in
his case. However, the court noted that its previous decision inBassette
v. Thompson 31 had found the Ake requirement to be a "new rule" as
32
interpreted in Teague v. Lane.
In Teague, the United States Supreme Court held that a habeas
petitioner defendant may not employ a new rule from a case decided after
his sentence became final unless the case falls under one of two
exceptions. 33 The new rule doctrine does not apply if the conduct in
question was (1) "beyond the power of the law-making authority to
29 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
30 915 F.2d at 938-39. See case summary of Bassette, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 8 (1991).
31 Gardner,1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *33; Teague, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). In Teague, a defendant attempted to invoke, upon collateral
review, the new rule from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, that the
prosecutor must give a racially neutral justification for his use of
peremptory challenges. The Court held that Batson was a "new rule"
which could not be retroactively applied. The Teague Court defined a
"new rule" as one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or Federal Government ....
or if the result was not dictated
by precedent." 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original).
32 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.

proscribe, ' 34 or (2) "if it requires the observance of 'those procedures
that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'. ' 35 Neither exception
applied to Gardner, and, therefore, because Ake was decided after his
sentence had become final, Ake could not be retroactively applied upon
36
collateral review.
The Teague decision should put defense counsel on notice that the
Supreme Court intends to seriously curtail access to federal habeas
corpus review. Taking this into consideration, counsel must be most
conscientious in developing and advancing all possible constitutional
arguments, both state and federal, at the earliest possible stages of the
proceedings so as to avoid permanently waiving them. Preserving issues
for appeal also allows the defendant to take advantage of any favorable
changes in the law. In the meantime, counsel should continue to advance
new rules, even on habeas, because they may fit within the exceptions,
and to test the limits to which the Court is willing to carry the Teague
"new rule" doctrine.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
33 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. UnitedStates, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971)).
34 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S.at 693 (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut,302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
35 For a more extensive discussion of the "new rule" doctrine, see
case summary of Williams v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest, this issue;
case summary of Adams v. Aiken, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; and
case summary of Stringerv. Black, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
36
See, e.g. Williamsv.Dixon,691 F.2d448 (4thCir. 1992) (finding
that even if the Court's ruling in McKoy v. North Carolina,494 U.S. 433
(1990), was a new rule, it fell within an exception to Teague and thus
could be retroactively applied). See case summary of Williams, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.

SPANN v. MARTIN
963 F.2d 663 (1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS
In October 1981, Sterling Barnett Spann was indicted for criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree, robbery, burglary, and murder of an 82year-old widow. He was convicted on all counts and received a life
sentence for the burglary, thirty years (consecutively) for criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree, ten years (consecutively) for robbery, and
death by electrocution for murder.
Spann appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.1 Spann then appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal. 2 He
subsequently began state postconviction proceedings, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and alleging various guilt and sentencing
errors, but the state court denied his petition. Spann's petition for
certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court was denied in 1985.
Spann's subsequent petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was also denied. In 1986, Spann filed for a writ ofhabeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. The court referred the matter to a magistrate for findings and
1 State v. Spann, 308 S.E.2d 518 (S.C. 1983).
2 Spann v. South Carolina,466 U.S. 947 (1984).

recommendations. The magistrate subsequently filed a 173-page report
and recommendation. After a ninety-day extension, petitioner filed
objections to the report and sought to amend his habeas corpus petition.
In 1988, the district court allowed the amendment and once again
submitted the matter to the magistrate. A fifty-page recommendation
followed, as did a response (and two supplemental memoranda) by
petitioner.
In February 1991, Spann "filed a motion for leave 'to reexhaust his
claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel in the South Carolina Courts in
light ofFretiv. State," 3 a new state case. The U.S. District Court granted
Spann's request and dismissed the writ without prejudice. The issue
before the Fourth Circuit was whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting that motion without prejudice.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
the district court abused its discretion in granting Spann's motion to
dismiss withoutprejudice. 4 The court found thattherespondent (here the
3 Spann v. Martin,963 F.2d 663,671; Frett,378 S.E.2d 249 (S.C.
1988).
4 Spann, 963 F.2d at 672.

